Chalmers et al: Metametaphysics

Ve čtvrtek jsem zmiňoval knihu Davida Chalmers et al. Metametaphysics: New Essays on the Foundations of Ontology (Oxford UP, 2009). (Srv. NDPR; starší příspěvky k metametafyzice: 26.05.2011). Pro orientaci, zde je synoptický přehled obsahu tohoto důležitého sborníku:

1. Introduction: A Guided Tour of Metametaphysics (David Manley)
   1. Worrying about Metaphysics
   2. Themes from Carnap and Quine
   3. Verbal Disputes
   4. No Determinate Truth Value?
   5. Epistemic Pessimism
   6. Easy Answers
   7. Defending Mainstream Metaphysics
   8. Reforming Metaphysics
   9. Conclusion
2. Composition, Colocation, and Metaontology (Karen Bennett)
   1. 'That's a Stupid Question'
   2. Three Kinds of Dismissivism
   3. A Methodological Suggestion
   4. Two Metaphysical Disputes
       4.1. Constitution
       4.2. Composition
       4.3. Preliminary Analogies
   5. Difference Minimization I: Downplaying Excess Ontology
   6. Against Semanticism
       6.1. Hirsch's Notion of a Verbal Dispute
       6.2. The Linking Principles are not Analytic
   7. Difference Minimization II: Up-Playing Expressive Power
       7.1. The Nihilist
       7.2. The One-Thinger
   8. The Costs of Up-Playing Expressive Power
   9. Problems Rearising for the Low-Ontologist
   10. The Third Dismissive Attitude
3. Ontological Anti-Realism (David J. Chalmers)
   1. Introduction
   2. Ontological and Ordinary Existence Assertions
   3. Disagreements in Commonsense Ontology
   4. Disagreements in Ontological Theory
   5. Ontological Realism and Ontological Anti-realism
   6. Lightweight and Heavyweight Realism
   7. Against Lightweight Realism
   8. Against Heavyweight Realism
   9. Models, Worlds, and Domains
   10. An Analysis of Ordinary Existence Assertions
   11. An Analysis of Ontological Existence Assertions
   12. Questions and Objections
   13. Conclusion
4. Carnap and Ontological Pluralism (Matti Eklund)
   1. Introduction
   2. External and Internal Questions
   3. The Shalowness of Ontological Questions
   4. Ontological Pluralism
   5. Was Carnap an Ontological Pluralist?
   6. Semanticism
   7. Against Ontological Pluralism
   8. On Some Replies to the Foregoing Arguments
   9. A Different Route? 
5. The Question of Ontology (Kit Fine) 
6. The Metaontology of Abstraction (Bob Hale and Crispin Wright)
7. Superficialism in Ontology (John Hawthorne)
   1. Verificationism
   2. Intensional Issues
   3. Hyperintensional Issues
   4. Conclusion
8. Ontology and Alternative Languages (Eli Hirsch)
   1. Introduction
   2. Alternative Languages
   3. Verbal Disputes and Interpretive Charity
   4. The Demand for a Semantics
   5. Platonism versus Nominalism
   Appendix: Duran's Dilemma (a parable)
9. Ambitious, Yet Modest, Metaphysics (Thomas Hofweber)
   1. What can Metaphysics Hope to do?
   2. Ontology as Esoteric Metaphysics
   3. Ontology as Egalitarian Metaphysics
      3.1. Polysemous Quantifiers
      3.2. Non-Referential Singular Terms
      3.3. Internalism vs. Externalism
      3.4. Internalism about (Talk about) Natural Numbers
      3.5. Internalism about (Talk about) Properties and Propositions
      3.6. A domain for Ontology
   4. The Answer to the Ontological Question
   5. The Prospects for Ontology
10.Ways of Being (Kris McDaniel)
   1. Introduction
   2. Senses of "Being", Ways of Being
   3. Theodore Sider Meets Martin Heidegger
   4. Heidegger and the Ontological Deflationist
   5. Ways of Believing in Ways of Being
   6. Some Brief Remarks on Other Ontological Debates
      6.1. Subsistence Revisited
      6.2. Possibilism 
11. Metaphysics after Carnap: The Ghost Who Walks? (Huw Price)
   1. The Car Nap Case
   2. Carnap's Deflationism
   3. Quine's Defense of Metaphysics - The Bad News
   4. Against Pluralism?
   5. Carnap, Quine and Ryle on the "Mixing of Spheres"
   6. Sving Ontology?
   7. Is the an Argument from Indispensability?
   8. How Metaphysical is Modal Realism? 
12. On What Grounds What (Jonathan Schaffer)
   1. Three Conceptions of Metaphysical Structure
        1.1. The Quinean View: On What There is
        1.2. The Aristotelian View: On What Grounds What
        1.3. Metaphysical Structures: Flat, Sorted, and Ordered
   2. Three Arguments for Ordered Structure Plus Permissivism
        2.1. Permissivism: The Triviality of Existence Questions
        2.2. Ordering: The Importance of Dependence Structure
        2.3. Substantial Presuppositions: The Quinean Method Presupposes Aristotelian Structure
   3. Towards a neo-Aristotelian Framework
        3.1. The Grounding Family
        3.2. Grounding Itself
        3.3. Illustration: A neo-Aristotelian Metaphysics
13. Ontological Realism (Theodore Sider)
   1. The Ontology of Composite Material Objects
   2. Losing One's Nerve
   3. Forms of Ontological Deflationism
   4. Blame the Predicates or the Quantifiers?
   5. Quantifier Variance
   6. Other Ways to be Shallow
   7. Structure
   8. Regimentation of Talk of Structure
   9. Logical Structure
   10. Quantificational Structure
   11. Reply to the Deflationist
   12. What Should We Believe?
14. Ontology, Analyticity, and Meaning: the Quine-Carnap Dispute (Scott Soames)
    1. Ontological Commitment and Abstract Objects in "On What There is"
    2. Ontology and the Rejection of Metaphysics in "Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology"
    3.  Abstract Objects and the Role of Analyticity in "Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology"
    4. "Two Dogmas" and Beyond: Quine and Carnap on Meaning, Reference, and Analyticity
    5. The Relevance of Quine's Holism to the Dispute over Analyticity and Ontology
    6. Extracting Posibite Lessons about Ontology from the Debate
15. Anwerable and Unanswerable Questions (Amie L. Thomasson)
   1. Problems about Reference
   2. Questions about Identity and Persistence
   3. Questions about Existence
   4. Specific Existence Questions
   5. Generic Existence Questions: Three Ways of Looking at Things
       5.1. Sortal Uses
       5.2. The Covering Use
       5.3. The Alleged Neutral Use
   6. Quantification and Existence Questions
   7. The Metaphysician's Work 
16. Being, Existence, and Ontological Commitment (Peter van Inwagen) 
   Thesis 1. Being is not an activity
   Thesis 2. Being is the same as existence
   Thesis 3. Existence is univocal
   Thesis 4. The single sense of being or existence is adequately capture by the existential quantifier of formal logic 
17. Must Existence-Questions have Answers? (Stephen Yablo)
    1. Introduction
    2. Goals and Desiderata
    3. Ontology Recapitulates Philology
    4. Counting as False
    5. Counting as True
    6. Nominalistic Ramifications(?)
    7. Platonistic Ramifications(?)
    8. Quizzicalistic Ramifications(?)
    9. Extent of the Phenomenon

Na první pohled mě nejvíce zaujaly příspěvky Kit Fina, Kris McDaniela, Jonathana Schaffera, Amie Thomasson, a Peter van Inwagena.